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ABSTRACT 
Background: Medication errors comprise a significant proportion of medical errors, and 
are abundant, costly, and associated with causing harm to patients via adverse drug 
events. The most serious medication errors often involve IV medications. Smart pumps 
were developed to improve patient safety by reducing medication errors. While some 
studies have found that smart pumps do not decrease medication errors, most have found 
they are effective to some degree. It is believed that routinely analyzing data on smart 
pump alerts, making corresponding adjustments in the drug libraries, and analyzing those 
adjustments can reduce alarm fatigue, which may then decrease medication errors by 
resulting in less smart pump users overriding the alerts and utilizing workarounds of 
smart pump safety features. 
Objective: The objective of this study is to assess if changes made to the Indiana 
University Health system smart pump drug library decreased nuisance alerts by 
comparing the actions taken in response to alerts before and after the changes were made. 
Methods: For a given change made to the Indiana University Health smart pump drug 
library on April 1, 2016, actions taken in response to alerts corresponding to that change 
three months prior to and three months after the change were analyzed. The primary 
outcome was the percent of total alerts that were overrides.  Using data from the smart 
pumps, the number of overrides, reprograms, cancels, and total alerts for each drug in the 
first and second quarter were recorded. The percentage of total alerts that were overrides, 
the percentage of total alerts that were reprograms, and the ratio of overrides to 
reprograms for each quarter were calculated.  
Results: Analysis was conducted on 8 drugs: carboplatin, fentanyl PCA, hydromorphone 
PCA, morphine PCA, morphine PCA 10-24kg, morphine PCA >40kg, naloxone, and 
octreotide. From the first quarter to the second quarter, the percent of overrides increased 
for 3 drugs, but for all 3, the number of overrides and total alerts decreased. Of the 5 
drugs that had a decrease in the percent of overrides, 3 had an increase in the number of 
overrides and total alerts. Only 2 drugs had a decrease in the percent of overrides and the 
number of overrides and total alerts. Statistical significance was achieved only for 
hydromorphone PCA and morphine PCA. The difference between the first and second 
quarters in the all the measured outcomes varied between the drugs. 
Conclusions: Forming any definitive conclusions was difficult due to the results 
containing a significant amount of variation. The literature suggests methods to improve 
smart pump usage, and improve medication safety by extension. These methods are 
interfacing smart pumps with computerized physician order entry, clinical decision 
support systems, electronic medical record/electronic medication administration record, 
pharmacy information systems, bar-coded medication administration, and laboratory 
data, as well as improving smart pump safety features compliance through education of 
smart pump users, leadership support, including/consulting smart pump users in drug 
library design, and routinely using the event log data as a component of a continuous 
quality improvement program. These methods are all in line with the current, trending 
belief that the best method for preventing medication errors is making changes to the 
medication use system as a whole to correct underlying systems failures instead of 
addressing a single point, such a smart pump alerts.  
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BACKGROUND 
The National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and 
Prevention defines a medication error as “any preventable event that may cause or lead to 
inappropriate medication use or patient harm while the medication is in the control of the 
healthcare professional, patient, or consumer.”1,2  Medication errors comprise a 
significant proportion of medical errors, and are abundant, costly, and associated with 
causing harm to patients via adverse drug events (ADEs).1,3-5 It is well known that ADEs 
are a leading cause of medical injury and costly from a variety of perspectives.5-7 Due to 
varying definitions and methods of detecting them, the exact incidence of medication 
errors and ADEs, as well as the incidence of medication errors that cause ADEs, are 
difficult to accurately measure and therefore controversial and unclear.1,2,6 Most 
medication errors occur in the ordering and administration stages of the medication use 
process.1-3,6,8 The most dangerous medication errors are those that occur during the 
administration phase because they result in the most patient harm and are the least likely 
to be intercepted.2,8 Intravenous (IV) medications, along with high-risk medications (ex. 
insulin, heparin, morphine), which are so named due to their high risk of causing severe 
patient harm, are commonly associated with medication errors.1,8,9 The most serious 
medication errors (resulting in the most severe harm to patients) often involve IV 
medications.1,8 
One technology developed to improve patient safety by reducing medication 
errors is smart pumps. In the literature, the term “smart pump” describes infusion pumps 
and/or devices which incorporate software programs that provide customizable drug 
libraries containing limits on doses, concentrations, volumes, and administration rates 
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specific to different medications and particular care areas/units in the facility.1,2,8-11 When 
the user turns on the smart pump, they must first choose a particular clinical area (ex. 
ICU).1,10 The pump is then automatically configured to meet the requirements of that 
specific clinical area.1,10 When infusions are programmed outside the preprogramed 
limits, alerts are generated, and users can reprogram the infusion to be within the 
preprogrammed limits, override the alert (and continue medication administration as 
originally programmed) when allowed, or cancel the infusion.8,9  
Several studies and literature reviews have been conducted that examine the 
efficacy of smart pumps at increasing patient safety by preventing medication errors. 
While some studies have found that smart pumps do not decrease medication errors, most 
have found they are effective to some degree. 1,2,11 However, all the studies found that 
smart pumps can only detect and prevent errors related to incorrect smart pump 
programming when the drug library limits are exceeded, and that ability is severely 
limited by noncompliance with the smart pumps’ safety features.1,2,11 Noncompliance 
includes actions such as smart pump users not selecting drugs from the drug libraries (and 
therefore bypassing the pump’s safety features) and/or ignoring the smart pump’s alerts 
and alarms 1,11  
Smart pumps record/capture an extensive amount of detailed programming and 
alert data on every infusion in their event logs, so reports for analyzing and evaluating 
drug libraries and clinical practice trends can be generated from that data.7-10 By 
increasing compliance with smart pump safety features via refining drug libraries, these 
reports guide quality improvement as well as increase medication safety.1,7-11 This is 
because it is believed that routinely analyzing data on alerts, making corresponding 
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adjustments in the customizable drug libraries, and analyzing those adjustments can 
reduce alarm fatigue/minimize alerts that are perceived as “nuisance alerts”, which may 
then result in less smart pump users overriding the alerts and utilizing workarounds of 
smart pump safety features.8,9 Voluntary incident and/or error reporting systems 
inherently have reporting bias, but smart pump event log data provides an objective way 
to calculate and/or analyze how often smart pumps prevent errors.1,2,5,6,11 Both the 
Carolinas HealthCare System (CHS) and University of Pittsburgh Medical Center 
(UPMC) health systems have experienced decreased smart pump alerts by consistently 
analyzing smart pump event log data, and then using that data to evaluate and refine drug 
libraries as part of a continuous quality improvement (CQI) program.7,8 
Infusion Pump Informatics (IPI) is a members-only, web-based analytics system 
for conducting in-house evaluations and cross-facility comparisons of smart pump alert 
data.9 Data available from the analytics program includes, but is not limited to drug, 
profile (unit/clinical care area), facility/hospital, amount or percent exceeding limits, and 
actions taken in response to alerts.9 Patient data is not captured by the analytics system, 
and no records that are capable of linking back to individual patient records are collected. 
The objective of this study is to assess the efficacy of changes made to the Indiana 
University (IU) Health system (an IPI member) smart pump drug library at decreasing 
nuisance alerts by comparing the actions taken in response to alerts before and after the 
changes were made. The results will positively impact medication safety at IU Health by 
providing a valuable objective, metric analysis that will further promote the growth and 
sustainability of smart-pump initiatives across the IU Health system. 
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METHODS 
Study Design 
This is a before-and-after study of actions taken in response to alerts as a result of 
changes made in the IU Health smart pump drug library in April 2016. The IU Health 
system has a standardized smart pump drug library across 15 hospitals in Indiana. Several 
changes were uploaded to the drug library of all the smart pumps in the system on April 
1, 2016. For a given change, actions taken in response to alerts corresponding to that 
change three months prior to (in the first quarter/January-March 2016) and three months 
after (in the second quarter/April-June 2016) the change were analyzed.  
Exclusion Criteria 
Drugs with a change to their drug library were excluded from analysis if they did not 
have data from both quarters, no change was made to the limits in the drug library, or the 
intent of the change was not to reduce the number of overrides and total alerts (ex. 
standardization of the drug library across all the units).  
Outcomes 
The primary outcome was a surrogate of smart pump user behavior defined as the percent 
of total alerts that were overrides.  This percent should be lower in the second quarter if 
the drug library changes resulted in less overrides/alerts that are perceived as nuisance. 
Secondary outcomes were categorizing good catches and missed catches of errors as 
noted by actions taken in response to a given alert. Good catches were represented by 
reprograms, while missed catches were a result of overrides. The percent of total alerts 
that were reprograms and the ratio of overrides to reprograms were used to measure the 
secondary outcomes.  
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Data Collection 
All the changes made to the IU health smart pump drug library, including to which drug 
the change was made, were recorded in an Excel file. Using data from the IPI analytics 
program, two Excel files (one file containing data from the first quarter, and one 
containing data from the second quarter) were generated for each drug with a change 
made to its smart pump library. From this data, the number of overrides, reprograms, 
cancels, and total alerts for each drug for each quarter were recorded in a Word 
document, and the percentage of total alerts that are overrides for each quarter were 
calculated and also recorded in the Word document. In order to enter the data into 
Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) for statistical analysis, it had to be 
converted into a number format that SPSS can read and analyze. To do this, another 
Excel file was created that contained 1 table for each drug (see Example Table 1). Each 
table recorded how many overrides, reprograms, and cancels occurred in each profile an 
alert for the drug occurred in according to quarter. The actions were recorded as numbers 
(1=override, 2=cancel, 3=reprogram), and each profile was listed twice in each table, 
with a one at the end of the profile’s name indicating first quarter data, and a two 
indicating second quarter data. This data was then entered into SPSS.  
Statistical Analysis 
The before and after groups (first vs. second quarter data) were compared using 
dependent sample chi-square tests for categorical data.  A 2-sided p value of less than 
0.05 was considered statistically significant, and statistical analysis was conducted using 
Statistical Package for Social Sciences version 13.0 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL). The 
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percent of total alerts that were overrides, the percent of total alerts that were reprograms, 
and the ratio of the number of overrides to the number of reprograms were calculated. 
RESULTS 
Drugs Analyzed 
A total of 10 drugs that had a change made to their drug library in April 2016 had data for 
both the first and second quarters. Analysis was conducted on 8 of those drugs 
(carboplatin, fentanyl PCA, hydromorphone PCA, morphine PCA, morphine PCA 10-
24kg, morphine PCA >40kg, naloxone, octreotide), and 2 of them (IV fluid [IVF] 
potassium and valproate) were excluded. The change made to IVF potassium’s drug 
library was standardizing the limits across all of the profiles, which was done to deduce 
how to best build the drug library, and not to reduce the number of overrides and total 
alerts. Therefore, IVF potassium was excluded. Valproate was excluded because the 
change made to its drug library was adding features/limits, so no existing limits were 
actually changed.  
Percent of Total Alerts That Were Overrides (table 2) 
Table 1 displays the number of overrides, cancels, reprograms, and total alerts and the 
percent of total alerts that were overrides (the data recorded in the Word document) for 
each drug according to quarter. From the first quarter to the second quarter, the percent of 
overrides increased for three of the eight drugs analyzed (fentanyl PCA, morphine PCA 
>40kg, naloxone), but for all three, the number of overrides and total alerts decreased. Of 
the five drugs that had a decrease in the percent of overrides, three of them (carboplatin, 
morphine PCA, octreotide) had an increase in the number of overrides and total alerts. 
Only two drugs (hydromorphone PCA and morphine PCA 10-24kg) had a decrease in the 
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percent of overrides and the number of overrides and total alerts, and both were narcotics. 
Statistical significance was achieved only for hydromorphone PCA and morphine PCA. 
The difference in the percent of overrides between the first and second quarters varied 
between the drugs. 
 Percent of Total Alerts That Were Reprograms (table 3) 
There was an increase from the first to the second quarter in the percent of total alerts that 
were reprograms for four of the drugs (hydromorphone PCA, morphine PCA, morphine 
PCA 10-24kg, octreotide). A decrease in the percent of reprograms occurred for the other 
four drugs (carboplatin, fentanyl PCA, morphine PCA >40kg, naloxone). Variation 
existed between the drugs in the difference between the two quarters in the percent of 
reprograms. 
Ratio of the Number of Overrides to the Number of Reprograms (table 4) 
The ratio of the number of overrides to the number of reprograms increased from the first 
quarter to the second quarter for three of the drugs (carboplatin, fentanyl PCA, naloxone) 
and decreased for two of the drugs (hydromorphone PCA, octreotide). All three of the 
remaining drugs (morphine PCA, morphine PCA 10-24kg, morphine PCA >40kg) were 
morphine and had zero reprograms in either the first or the second quarter. A ratio of 
overrides to reprograms could therefore not be calculated for one of the two quarters, so a 
difference in the ratio between the first and second quarters could not be determined for 
those drugs. Between the drugs for which a difference in the overrides to reprograms 
ratio between the two quarters could be determined, that difference varied. 
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DISCUSSION 
 Ideally, the number of overrides and total alerts, the percent of overrides, and the 
ratio of overrides to reprograms would decrease, while the percent of reprograms would 
increase for each drug.  Hydromorphone PCA was the only drug that had ideal results for 
all of the measured outcomes. For the other 7 drugs, the number of outcomes with ideal 
results varied. The variation, together with the inconsistencies between all the drugs in 
the difference in the outcomes between the first and second quarters confer a high degree 
of variability to the results overall. Therefore, it is difficult to form any definitive 
conclusions from the results.  
 The actions taken in response to alerts were not analyzed based on profile, and the 
data on type of limit violated (dose, infusion duration, concentration, volume, 
administration rate, etc.), facility, or amount by which the limit was exceeded was not 
utilized. This is a limitation of the study because those variables are potential 
confounders, and if the actions taken in response to alerts had been analyzed based on 
those subgroups, some concrete conclusions may have been able to be formed. A second 
limitation of the study is the small sample size/number of drugs analyzed. If a longer time 
frame had been examined, trends in the data may have been found due to the potential for 
having more drugs to evaluate. Since IPI does not provide access to any patient-specific 
information or information about why the smart pump users took the actions they did, it 
was impossible to distinguish between nuisance alerts and non-nuisance alerts. Not 
distinguishing between nuisance and non-nuisance alerts is another limitation of the study 
because its objective was to assess the efficacy of changes made to the IU Health drug 
library at decreasing nuisance alerts due to drug library inaccuracies. Also, the reasoning 
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behind the study’s objective is to help achieve the clinical practice goal of increasing 
medication safety by decreasing the number of nuisance alerts, so alarm fatigue will 
decrease/less non-nuisance alerts will be overridden and more errors will be intercepted. 
Essentially, the actions taken in response to alerts were used as a surrogate for smart 
pump user behavior, and we had no data that directly pertained to the reasoning behind 
that behavior.  
 Previous research has shown that smart pumps are still vulnerable to medication 
errors, mainly due to noncompliance with their safety features and the limited types of 
errors they can detect or prevent.1,2,10,11 Methods to improve medication safety via 
improving smart pump usage suggested by the literature are interfacing smart pumps with 
computerized physician order entry (CPOE), clinical decision support systems (CDSs), 
electronic medical record (EMR)/electronic medication administration record (eMAR), 
pharmacy information systems (PIS), bar-coded medication administration (BCMA), and 
laboratory data/results, as well as improving compliance with the smart pumps’ safety 
features through education of smart pump users, leadership support, including/consulting 
smart pump users in drug library design, and routinely using the event log data as a 
component of a CQI program.1,2,7-11 By interfacing smart pumps with other electronic 
systems, they may be able to prevent more types of errors, such as wrong drug, wrong 
dose, and wrong patient errors. Increasing compliance with smart pump safety features 
(via the previously mentioned methods) may enhance smart pumps’ ability to detect or 
prevent not only the incorrect programming errors, but also the errors interfacing with 
other systems would enable them to prevent.  
Page 12 
 
Future studies on the efficacy of smart pumps at decreasing medication errors 
should look at a time frame that is at least a year or two long, include a method to 
incorporate data that indicates the reasoning behind the behavior of smart pump users, 
and utilize subgroup analyses based on drug type, facility, profile, etc. A study could also 
compare smart pumps interfaced with other medical technologies (ex. CPOE, CDSs, 
EMR/eMAR, PIS, BCMA, lab data) with smart pumps that have not been interfaced 
regarding their efficacy at reducing medication errors.  
Due to evidence showing that errors are usually due to system failures/faulty 
system design that cause breakdowns at various points throughout the system, it is 
believed that making changes to the system as a whole/correcting the underlying systems 
failures will prevent errors.3-6 Evidence has also shown that that belief applies to 
medication errors because they can occur at any stage of the medication use process, and 
a single proximal cause can result in a variety of errors, and an error may result from 
several proximal causes.1-7,11 All of the previously mentioned methods to improve 
medication safety via improving smart pump usage involved changes made to the overall 
medication use system, and are therefore in line with the belief that correcting the 
underlying systems failures is the best method to prevent medication errors.  
CONCLUSION 
Forming any definitive conclusions was difficult due to the results containing a 
significant amount of variation. The literature suggests methods to improve smart pump 
usage, and improve medication safety by extension, are interfacing smart pumps with 
CPOE, CDSs, EMR/eMAR, PIS, BCMA, and laboratory data, as well as improving smart 
pump safety features compliance through education of smart pump users, leadership 
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support, including/consulting smart pump users in drug library design, and routinely 
using the event log data as a component of a CQI program. These methods are all in line 
with the current, trending belief that the best method for preventing medication errors is 
making changes to the medication use system as a whole to correct underlying systems 
failures. 
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Example Table 1: Actions Taken In Response to Alerts In Each Quarter According 
to Profile 
 
Fentanyl PCA 
  Action Taken 
Profile  1 2 3 
Hem/Onc 1 22 0 1 
Hem/Onc 2 0 0 0 
Adult Med/Surg 1  55 3 4 
Adult Med/Surg 2 21 2 1 
Adult ICU 1 40 5 2 
Adult ICU 2 15 1 0 
L&D 1 0 0 1 
L&D 2 0 0 0 
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Table 1: Number of Overrides, Cancels, Reprograms, and Total Alerts and Percent 
of Overrides According to Quarter 
 
Drug Overrides Cancels Reprograms Total Alerts Percent Overrides 
Carboplatin           
1st Quarter 160 9 3 172 93% (160/172) 
2nd Quarter 197 14 1 212 92.9% (197/212) 
Fentanyl PCA           
1st Quarter 117 8 8 133 88% (117/133) 
2nd Quarter 36 3 1 40 90% (36/40) 
Hydromorphone PCA           
1st Quarter 1115 55 81 1251 89.1% (1115/1251) 
2nd Quarter 29 3 9 41 70.7% (29/41) 
Morphine PCA           
1st Quarter 88 6 0 94 93.6% (88/94) 
2nd Quarter 112 5 15 132 84.8% (112/132) 
Morphine PCA 10-24kg           
1st Quarter 18 1 0 19 94.7% (18/19) 
2nd Quarter 6 1 1 8 75% (6/8) 
Morphine PCA >40kg           
1st Quarter 23 0 1 24 95.8% (23/24) 
2nd Quarter 2 0 0 2 100% (2/2) 
Naloxone           
1st Quarter 30 8 10 48 62.5% (30/48) 
2nd Quarter 10 2 3 15 66.7% (10/15) 
Octreotide           
1st Quarter 127 27 23 177 71.8% (127/177) 
2nd Quarter 158 41 43 242 65.3% (158/242) 
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Table 2: Percent of Overrides 
Drug 1st Quarter 2nd Quarter Chi-Squared P Value 
Carboplatin 93% (160/172) 92.9% (197/212) 1.774 0.412 
Fentanyl PCA 88% (117/133) 90% (36/40) 0.859 0.651 
Hydromorphone PCA 89.1% (1115/1251) 70.7% (29/41) 15.689 <0.001 
Morphine PCA 93.6% (88/94) 84.8% (112/132) 11.918 0.003 
Morphine PCA 10-24kg 94.7% (18/19) 75% (6/8) 3.02 0.221 
Morphine PCA >40kg 95.8% (23/24) 100% (2/2) 0.087 0.768 
Naloxone 62.5% (30/48) 66.7% (10/15) 0.115 0.944 
Octreotide 71.8% (127/177) 65.3% (158/242) 2.286 0.319 
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Table 3: Percent of Reprograms 
Drug 1st Quarter 2nd Quarter 
Carboplatin 1.74% (3/172) 0.47% (1/212) 
Fentanyl PCA 6.02% (8/133) 2.5% (1/40) 
Hydromorphone PCA 6.47% (81/1251) 22% (9/41) 
Morphine PCA 0% (0/94) 11.4% (15/132) 
Morphine PCA 10-24kg 0% (0/19) 12.5% (1/8) 
Morphine PCA >40kg 4.17% (1/24) 0% (0/2) 
Naloxone 20.8% (10/48) 20% (3/15) 
Octreotide 13% (23/177) 17.8% (43/242) 
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Table 4: Ratio of Overrides to Reprograms 
Drug 1st Quarter 2nd Quarter 
Carboplatin 53.3 (160:3) 197 (197:1) 
Fentanyl PCA 14.6 (117:8) 36 (36:1) 
Hydromorphone PCA 13.8 (1115:81) 3.2 (29:9) 
Morphine PCA (88:0) 7.5 (112:15) 
Morphine PCA 10-24kg (18:0) 6 (6:1) 
Morphine PCA >40kg 23 (23:1) (2:0) 
Naloxone 3 (30:10) 3.3 (10:3) 
Octreotide 5.5 (127:23) 3.7 (158:43) 
 
